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RESUMEN 
Este artículo estudia el surgimiento de una nueva corriente educacional étnico-religiosa en 
Israel, Maayan Hachinuch Hatorani (HEI Manantial de la educación de la Torah"). Ella fue 
fundada en 1984 y está bajo el control del liderazgo de Shas, un movimiento de renovación 
religiosa y de identidad "sefaradí-oriental. Las políticas de discriminación implementadas 
en las instituciones Ashkenazíes ultra-ortodoxas, llevó a los líderes del movimiento Shas a 
fundar un nuevo sistema, capaz de responder a las dificultades de la población marginal iza-
da. Las escuelas de Shas, que pertenecen y son subsidiadas por el Ministerio de Educación, 
son además agentes de socialización, tanto para niños como para padres que están alejados 
de un estilo de vida religioso. Así, a través de la creación de estrategias para la transmisión 
del conocimiento y el comportamiento, la nueva corriente educacional desafia al proyecto 
nacional secular y contribuye a la formación de una nueva esfera cultural. 
En este artículo exploramos la manera en que el movimiento religioso hace uso de la edu-
cación como medio para extender la movilización social y fortalecer los lazos de solidari-
dad. La investigación está basada en un estudio etnográfico llevado a cabo durante los años 
2000-2005 en tres ciudades en Israel. A través de la trasformación de los límites culturales 
y la institucionalización de normas que contradicen los principios que sustentan las rela-
ciones entre el gobierno y la educación masiva, el sistema fundado por Shas contribuye a 
forjar un judaísmo israelí ultra-ortodoxo basado en una identidadétnica primordial. El caso 
contribuye tanto a entender el desafio que la religión le plantea a la educación moderna 
como a analizar nuevos desarrollos dentro del judaísmo. 
PALABRAS CLAVE: Educación, enclaves, etnicidad, Israel, judaísmo, límites culturales, 
movimientos sociales, religión, sefaradíes, Shas, ultra ortodoxia, t'shuva (retomo). 
ABSTRACT 
The paper focuses on the emergence of a new religious-ethnic cducational stream in Israel, 
Maayan Hachinuch Hatorani, ("The Wellspring of Torah Education"). It was founded in 
1984 and is controlled by the 1eadership of Shas, a movement of religious renewal and 
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Sephardic-Oriental identity. Discriminatory policies, implemented by the ultra-Orthodox 
Ashkenazi establishment, brought the leaders ofthe Shas movement to inítiate a new system 
capable of responding to the hardshipof a marginalized population. Shas schools, functioning 
within and being supported by the Ministry of Education, also became socializing agents 
for children and parents that were far from religious lifestyle. Thus, through the creation of 
strategies for the transmission of knowledge and behavior, the new stream challenges the 
secular national project, and contributes to the formatíon of a new cultural sphere. 
In this paper we explore how a religious movement embraces education to foster ~ocial 
mobilization and group solidarity. The research is an ethnographic study that was con-
ducted between 2000-2005 in three cities in Israel. By transforming cultural boundaries and 
institutionalizing norms that contradict in sorne respects the principies underlying the re-
lationship between govemment and mass schooling, Shas's education systcms contributes 
to forge an Ultra-Orthodox Israeli Judaism based on an ethnic type of primordial identity. 
The case contributes to understand the challenges that religion holds to modem systems of 
education and to analyze new developments in Judaism. 
KEY WORDS: Cultural boundaries, education, enclaves, ethnicity, Israel, Judaism, religion, 
Sephardim, Shas, social movement, Ultra Orthodox, t'shuva (return). 
THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM REPRESENTING SOCIAL ENCLAVES 
Israel can be thought of as a socíety of enclaves - políticallegal, cultural, social and territorial. 
In the words, for example, ofHorowitz and Lissak "social enclaves tend to form around move-
menls which act as secondary centers Ihat mobilize and allocate resources and commitments, re-
ceiving continuity through socializatíon and indoctrination" (Horowitz and Lissak 1987) p. 28). 
The use the word enclave in part simply draws attention to the degree of separation, which keeps 
groups in Israelí society more sharply apart than in comparable high-income countries. It denotes 
visible or palpable boundaries backed by a degree of institutionalization, and also the superimpo-
sition of several dífferent boundaries -for example territory, race, marriage education, language, 
and dress codeso In contrast to the ghettoes or banlieues of Westem Europe, which marginalize 
a certain category of group -notably immígrants and racial minorities- Israel's enclave pattem 
applies to a wide range of social groups and criss-crosses the entire social structure. 
The development ofthe Israeli educational system can be analyzed as the result ofthe coun-
Iry's changing institutional and cultural boundaries. Since the founding of the state, Israelí lead-
ers considered education as a powerful tool for the elimination of differences among immigrants, 
and the creation of a unified Israeli nation. Educational policy envisaged the reintegratíon of 
the separate Jewish cultural heritages into a collective identity, whose main bearer would be the 
Zionist State. Thus, the educational system has focused not only on the process of socializatíon, 
but also on the creation and transmission of symbols that represented the Jewish ídentity in the 
new state. However, the educational system also reflects an enclave pattem whose roots spring 
from the earliest development OL the Zionist movement in Palestíne ín 1902. The division of the 
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education system according to religious criteria (secular, national religious\ ultra-Orthodox) was 
inherited from the pre-State period (the Yishuv) when non-state Jewish institutions ran their own 
schools. These separate arrangements have been preserved in parallel to the patronage power of 
political parties in the state, also inherited from the pre-State period when the various Zionist 
parties left, right, centre, religious and secular and various permutations of these - had, in ac-
cordance with enclave principIe, their own kibbutz settlements, cooperatives, medical services, 
football teams and much else besides. 
The ultra-Orthodox haredim2 were, on the founding ofthe state ifIsrael, granted state-funded 
educational autonomy and legal prerogatives over personal status law for all Jews (Zameret, 
1997). Today, the educational enclaves provide a separate education system for Arabs and four 
main educational systems for Jews of different religious affiliation -including, as we shall see, 
the 'Shas' network known as 'The wellspring of Torah education' (HaMa 'ayan Hachinuch 
Hatorani). The state-funded education is divided, for the Jewish population, into a mainstream 
secular system (about 66 per cent), a "national religious" system (about 21 per cent), and an ul-
tra-Orthodox system (around 13 per cent). The existence ofthe different streams in publíc educa-
tion implied the state's formal recognition of the ethnic and religious segmentation in society. 
The Ma 'ayan Hahinukh Hatorani, the educational stream controlled by the leadership of 
Shas, the party of religious renewal and Sephardic-Oriental (Middle Eastern and North African) 
identity founded in 1984, is a paradigmatic instance of the construction of a segmented religious 
ídentity within the frame ofthe secular state. While the ultra-Orthodox educational system con-
trolled by the Ashkenazi religious authorities of Eastern European origin was a prolongation of 
the system already in place in the pre-independence period, the Orthodox Sephardic system is a 
recent creation, and a state product originating with the entry of Shas into government. Through 
Ma'ayan Hahinukh Hatorani, Shas competes with the state as an agent of primary education 
and it thus competes for the support and loyalty of constituents who fell that the state doesn't 
fulfill its obligation to them (Schifrnan, 2005)3. A paradox ofthe system is that despite receiving 
increasing levels of funding from the state, ultra-orthodox educational streams have effectively 
evaded state supervision and in many senses are not obligated to meet state curricular standards. 
One of the greatest achievements of the Shas' party in 2008, under Olmert's government, is the 
establishment of a law that exempts ultra-orthodox schools from the "core" of secular studies 
(English, mathematics, language) but allows them to receive higher state subsides. As 1 will 
National Religious schools were at first established in recognítion of the existence of a religious wing to 
Zionism at the founding ofthe state and before. Their currículum ís more religious than that ofstate secular 
schools, and ir is a realíty that their pupils tcnd to achieve less and to come from poorer backgrounds. They 
are ron by the Ministry ofEducation, unlike the schools ofthe ultra-Orthodox and Shas which are funded by 
the Ministry but managed independently. 
Literally, those who live infear ofGod. Haredim, here, are almost all Asbkcnazi Jews, heirs to tbe Russian-
Polish tradition; later that changes as we shall see. 
Ma 'ayan Hahinukh Hatorani schools that enroll children from non-ultra-orthodox families are located in 
statistical areas that are more Sephardíc and less ultraorthodox than the statistical arcas in which the net-
work's Talmud torahs are located. (Schiffman 2005: 104). 
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show, its educational practíces and institutions challenge the secular national project, and con-
tribute to the separatíon of collective and individual's Jife into new cultural spheres under the 
auspices of religious organizations. 
In this paper, we will discuss sorne of Shas' educational strategies and practices aimed at 
forging an Orthodox Israeli Judaism based on an ethnic type of primordial identity. We think 
that this case helps understand the growing of challenging over premises previously "taken for 
granted" in the cultural domain. The Shas educational system has created new strategies for the 
transmission of knowledge and the regulation of behavior, most of which are removed from the 
ideologies underlying Israeli education. Shas's educational practices have transformed cultural 
boundaries and institutionaJized norms that contradict in sorne respects the principies underly-
ing the relationship between government and mass schooling in most modern states (popkewitz 
1991:56). 
THE RISE OF A NEW ULTRA-ORTHODOX EDUCATlONAL NETWORK 
One of Shas's distinctive characteristics is its fascinating mix of "ideology and pragmatism 
"(Arian and Shamir 1986). The party's representation in the Knesset (the Israeli Parliament) has 
increased from four in 1984 to 17 in 1999, i.e. from 3 percent to 13 percent ofthe vote, being the 
third largest party in the Knesset and decreased to 11 sínce 2002 being in 2008, like the Likud 
Party, the third largest one. When the party is part of the coalition, it influences government al-
locations to the ultra-orthodox sector, redirecting large amounts of state funds to the Sepharadic 
public and institutions. Within this context, Shas deftly maneuvers the system, and uses it in 
order to extract resources for its educational enterprise. It also takes advantage of the loose su-
pervisíon government agencies exercise over educational institutions, and is able to divert funds, 
e. g. by using subsides províded for educatíon for religious affairs, for the support of informal 
religious activities, and even by transferring educational funds to the party budget. Since Shas' 
participation in govemment, subsidies for the ultra-orthodox in Israel have not only increased, 
but have also been distributed in greater part to ultra-orthodox Sephardim (Berman, 2000). When 
the Ministry of Education attempted to tighten control over budget allocation, Shas circumvent-
ed the new rules by establishing formally independent organizations, such as "The Fund for the 
Education of the Children of Israel" (Tesler 200 1). 
The Ma 'ayan Hahinukh Hatorani's documents and religious directives adopt methods and 
techniques from the modern secular system and use them for the construction of a new social 
space. In developing its educational network, Shas "piggybacked" on the concessions granted 
by the government in 1948 to ultra-Orthodox Ashkenazi communities. These were aIlowed to 
run a separate system ofpublicly supported schools and Yeshivas, with curricula imported from 
pre-World War II Eastern Europe, which contained mínimal amounts of modern and secular 
subjects. for a modern democratic government, this was an unusual arrangement. It sternmed 
from the fact that East European Jewish society and culture had been wiped out by the Holo-
caust, and it was an attempt to allow the remnants ofthis civilization to reconstruct at least sorne 
aspects of their culture. It was also the result of political equilibrium between different forces in 
the polítical realm. Shas has taken advantage of the rules of liberal democracy (Barzilai 2003) 
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and attempted to replace the ideologies of individualism and rationality, embedded in modern 
schooling, with ideas arising from religious authority. 
In order to understand the content ofShas's educational project, we should start by presenting 
the central element of its narrative, which Yeshiva students absorb from their teachers and party 
members and voters from its leaders. This narrative describes Sephardic cultural experience in 
the new state in terms of cultural victimization, a story whose focus is the Ashkenazim '8 alleged 
campaign aimed at the destruction of the "jewel" or "crown" of the traditions of North African 
JudaÍsm. The movement's representatives emphasize the fact that North African Judaism, unlike 
the European counterpart, did not experience Haskala, the Jewish version ofthe Enlightenment, 
which marked a fundamental watershed in Eastern European Jewish history. Due to the absence 
of pressures generated by the process of modernity in the lands of their ancestors, they were 
spared the cleavage between orthodoxy and secularism, which became central in European and 
North American Jewry. This is a world in which, despite variations in the intensity of religious 
observance and a measure of toleration of dissent, the central traditions of a Jewish way of life, 
the ritual s of the life cycle, the taboos surrounding sexual relations, the practice of endogamy, 
and the Rabbis' authority were respected and mostly unquestioned. The portrait is that of a soci-
ety whose central dynamics resided in the practice of traditional faith, embedded in the rhythms 
of everyday life, untainted by the conflicts between the orthodox and the secular, and untouched 
by the Holocaust (except for a brief period in Algeria, during Vichy). 
The Shas network had, in 2001-02, just under16000 students in elementary and intermedi-
ate schools and about 15,000 in kindergartens, and a teacher-training college4• The numbers 
had increased slowly. Although these figures are relatively small, they have an important sym-
bolic meaning for the educational system in Israel. Shas leaders regularly emphasize the signifi-
cance of the network and its important role in the political dealings. The "Talmud torah" and 
the "schools" are the main types of schools in the network. The Talmud torahs mainly focus on 
religious studies and serve children from traditional Sephardic ultra-orthodox families. The other 
schools in the network teach more secular studies and serve children from traditíonal families or 
those whose parents have recently become more religiously observant. 
Leaders of the movement have invoked several factors to legitímize the development of a 
different educational network. Sorne emphasize a sense of social injustice due to the increasing 
gap within the state system between the pupils of Oriental Ofigin and the Israelis of European-
American origino Others refer to a discriminatory policy carried out by the Ashkenazi Orthodox 
learning institutions (yeshivas) against the Oriental Orthodox population. But rather than a com-
pensatory mechanism, party leaders and ideologues present the Shas educational system as a 
central device in the project of a "religious revolution", whose main objective is "to impose in a 
Data from [he Ministry ofEducation's department for "recognizcd, non-officiaI funded" education (d., the 
institutions of the Asbkenazi ultra-Orthodox and Shaz). Shas tends to claim much more, and of course the 
funding received by the network is calculated according to the number of pupils, so these numbers are a mat-
ter of controversy. This, however, is an official source. 
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democratic way a religious lifestyle on the entire population of Israel, thus changing the relations 
between the secular majority and the religious minority" (Tesler 200 1). They expect schools to 
consolidate and disseminate the vision of their undisputed leader, Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, in mat-
ters of renewal of religious observance (1 'shuva) and try to attain these aims by appropriating 
resources and jurisdictional autonomy from the state. 
LEGlTlMATING THE EDUCATlONAL NETWORK: INEQUITY AND DlSCRIMINATION 
Israel is a country of immigrants containing about seventy different Jewish ethnic groups, 
as well as a non-Jewish, mainly Arab, minority comprising about 19 percent of the population. 
The government's policy with regard to the absorption of the Jewish majority, which tripled 
during the years 1949-1960, assumed that, despite the differences among ethnic groups, underly-
ing similarities would permit the establishment of the common collective identity. The national 
educational system, guided by the secular Zionist ideology, pursued the minimization of cultural 
differences. In the 1950s, the goal was "assimilation," which assumed permeability and certain 
convergence among all the ethnic groups (Horowitz 1981; Smocha 1993)5. Later, educational 
policies aimed at replacing heterogeneity with a common culture based on enlightened, human-
istic, Western conceptions of nationalism, freedom, democracy and equality (Kahane 1998). 
Within a frame offormal equality, policy-makers interpreted the gap in academicachievement 
between Jewish pupils of EuropeanJ American origin and those of Middle Eastern background 
as an ethnic problem. New programs aimed at compensating cultural disadvantages included 
more hours of schooling, more resources for homogeneously oriental schools, and similar mea-
sures. Their effect, however, on the reduction of differences in achievement between Ashkenazi 
and Sephardic children was only marginal. The search for new mechanisms led authorities to 
implement during the seventies an educational reform that adopted the structural division ofthe 
American system, and fostered the integration of children from different ethnic backgrounds 
into the same classrooms. Still, these reforms had a slight impact in closing the achievement gap 
(Nahon 1984; Peled 2001; Shavit 1990). 
Both negative labeling and cultural marginality contributed to Oriental Jews' resentment and 
alienation. Their support for parties that articulated these feelings, Shas in particular, intensified 
over time (Peled, 2001). From its beginnings, the party advocated the creation of kindergartens 
and schools in peripheral areas of the country, where groups from Oriental origin and low in-
come were over-represented, and where unemployment, crime, drug abuse and school failure 
had been perennial problems (Chen 1995). Oriental Jews living in these areas had particularly 
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Up to the end ofthe World War 1, under Ottoman rule, Sephardim (Oriental Jews) constituted the majority 
of the Jewish population in Palestine. Under British rule immigration dramatieally ehanged the numerieal 
balance of Ashkenazim and Sepbardim. After lndependenee in 1984, mass immigration from Arab eountries 
brought in large numbers ofSephardim who were relative Jy untouehed by the encounters with religious and 
secular Zionism and with Western ideas. 
strong feelings of discrimination, a fertile soil for the diffusion of the new cultural identity ad-
vocated by Shas. 
"RETURNING TO RELIGION" (T'SHUVA): THE SHAPING OF A NEW CULTURE 
In the course of 2000 and 2006 we conducted research in Jerusalem, in the Tel Aviv satellite 
town of Petach Tikva and in the dormitory town of Bet Shemesh near Jerusalem, intervíewing 
officials and educators in the Shas network. They justified the need for their schools in terms of 
ensuring the transmission ofthe substantive values of Judaism. Few ofthem blamed discrimina-
tory policies for children's low formal achievement. Neitherdid they complain about the lack of 
compensatory mechanisms, or about the lack of compatíbility between the Western pedagogic 
methods and their culture. 
Rather, they explained the social failure and moral decline besetting the Sephardim on the 
experience of rapid-fire secularizatíon, in which immigrants were cut off from the religious 
habits of their places of origin and more or less forced into a modern way of life. According to 
an official of the Maayan Hachinuch Hatorani, Oriental Jews' feelings of cultural deprivation 
and humiliation were the result of the attempt to replace rapidly their ancestral culture with the 
"enlightened" and Zionist knowledge. In its rhetoric, Shas claims that its educational system 
has tried, in one of its prominent politicians words, " ... to give the Sephardim their home back"-
leachzir atarah leyoshna- literally "restore the Crown to its old glory' '. He claimed that " ... edu-
cation is the solution for chazara bet'shuva," (those returning to religion)", and argued, "The 
secular system was falling apart because ofviolence, drugs, lack ofrespect for parents ... We do 
not have problems ofviolence or drugs ... [in our milieu], the relatíon between parents and child 
is completely different. They are not friends: their relationship is hierarchical", 
Taking as a point of departure the Zionist emphasis on the European Jewish experience, 
while neglecting and even ignoring the history of Oriental Jews (Almog 1997), Shas leaders 
have placed the blame on the Israeli history curriculum (especially the centrality it assigns to the 
Ashkenazi founding fathers, such as David Ben- Gurion and Chaim Weizmann), the teaching of 
Israeli líterature, and social and civic studies, for what they claim has been the destruction of the 
bases of Judaism and tradition. To Zionist values, they oppose a set of countervailing principIes: 
respect for tradition, obedience of parents and teachers, study of sacred texts, and in general the 
revival of Oriental Jewish customs and virtues, Against the modemizing view of children as the 
key to social progress and consolidation ofthe national ideology, lhey portray children as the key 
to the continuity of culture and customs. In [he words of an expert in the network 's Pedagogical 
Center, "the studies taught in the national educational system must be replaced by traditional 
values, [the ones] we learned from our grandparents. Since we ourselves cannot teach them to 
our children, we need to send them to schools where they will learn [these values]". 
The discrepancy between the new schooling proposed by the movement and lhe basic 
assumptions of the national educatíonal system may be exemplified in a letter sent to the Shas 
newspaper "Maayan Hashavua" (the Weekly Spring), in which a reader argued: "Om parents 
carne lo Zion with joy, they carne to the Holy Land with tears. Oíd they [come] so that their 
children would be educated in the negation and dishonor of all Holiness? Are our children 
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supposed to admire Hegel and Goethe instead of the Holiness of Israel? Are they súpposed to 
quote Shakespeare instead ofthe Song ofSongs? What is going to be the source oftheír Judaism' 
[will it be] Mathematics and English'? After one hundred and twenty years, when they meet 
their grandparents, what will their common language be AIgebra problem? Chemical formulae?" 
(Quoted in Chen 1995: 12). 
For Shas, education is also a tool for the redrawing of the boundaries of family life, for the 
attainment of the broader goal, that of bringing people back to traditionai religious observance-
t'shuva-; the altemative road it proposes to the whole Jewish people. To the secular Zíonist goals 
of a liberal democratic state for the Jewish people, Shas opposes the ideal of a society based on 
the preservatíon of traditional values. lts leaders hope that education based on the rediscovery 
of sacred sources and on ritual practices will be a channel for the retum of students' families 
to religious observance. They are aware that the fulfillment of mitzvoth, a fundamental Jewish 
concept meaning commandments and good deeds, can only be sustained when it becomes a fam-
ily experience. The often-quoted image of children reading the weekly portion of the Torah to 
their parents indicates Shas's purpose of inverting the conventional mechanism of socialization. 
In the words of Eli Ishai, the politicalleader of Shas, the growth in the number of children in the 
schools is a vote of trust for the movement since parents rely on the contents transmitted to the 
children. (Ynet 23-7-2008). 
The growth ofthe Shas educational system, which was established in the 1990s and has been 
slowly growing ever since, has contributed not only to a sharpening of the major ethnic and cul-
tural subdivisions within the Jewish population, but al so to a convergence between ethnicity and 
religiosity. Its teachers and students are practically all Sephardim, and it has endeavored to attract 
students not only from ultra-Orthodox and other traditional religious families, but also, and espe-
cially, from non-religious backgrounds. The system's reach is not confined to day schools: Shas 
has generated a variety of additional programs, including after-school activities for children, a 
youth movement, evening lessons for men and women, and religious learning centers (yeshivas). 
Thus, Shas has created the infrastructure of a new ethno-religíous coIlective identity. 
One of the central themes in Shas education is the institutionalization of precise and dif-
ferentiated roles for men and women. Until the eighth grade, boys are exposed to both secular 
and religious studies, but secular studies diminish gradually from the ninth grade on, and the 
curriculum concentrates on the study of the Talmud and the minutiae of the Halakhah (Jewish 
law). In conformance with Jewish traditional practice, in which the obligation of studying Torah 
was particularly focused on men, Shas's expectation is that as many boys as possible will, after 
finishing school, enroll in specialized religious institutions the Talmud Torah and primary-Ievel 
yeshivas. As for girls, they receive a broader educatíon than boys in secular matters, since they 
are expected do go in the labor market to support their families. They are not expected to deepen 
their relígious educatíon, for their traditional function is only to manage the household, and raise 
children based on religious precepts and moral rules rooted in religion. 
The system itself is divided in three different tracks according to the famílies' degree of 
religiosity. A principal of an Ultra-Orthodox school in Beit Shemesh said that "you can't mix 
mature and non-mature material; you must be sure about what you have in hand". Shas schools 
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also entice parents, especially non-observant and poor ones, by offering them additional benefits: 
longer school days (especially valuable for families interested in 'keeping children off the 
streets'), and transport to and from school. The requirements for enrolment are quite simple: 
Parents must take care to observe Sabbath, Jewish dietary rules, and proper and respectable 
behavior, inclllding the prohibition ofbad langllage and streetwise habits. Since teachers keep a 
check on whether these commitments are being respected, families have incentives to conformo 
Thus, children from non-religious background became agents of transformation since they 
socialize their parents into the new norms, customs and "mitzvoth". The pressure from school 
authorities to take children out of school, a step with high economic and social consequences, 
inflicts parents who refuse to adopt religious precepts. In the end, Shas's "soft" approach to 
t shuva is usually successful: children and familíes change, when necessary, their patterns of 
behavior, observance, dress, and language, and are absorbed into the new sub-culture. 
THE REVIVAL OF TRADlTlON IN A MODERN CONTEXT 
To place t shuva in the context of a bureaucratic apparatus is to point to its relationship to 
modernity and, though sorne may find this strange, secularization. For if from one perspective 
t 'shuva can be seen as a reverse to tradition, or as a reaction against modernity (a point on which 
both supporters or antagonists of the movement seem to agree), it is also a case of modern reli-
gion, because beliefs are transmitted and reinforced, and even codified, by bureaucratic institu-
tions and socialízation agencies. Of course, these institutions may not be models of impersonal-
ity and transparency, but they are nevertheless quite different from the family and other primary 
relationships that had ensured the reproduction of religious culture in Jewish communities in 
Eastern Europe and North Africa. 
The placement of t shuva in a modern context also implies to look for the appropriate frame-
works that constructs and interprets the systems of knowledge capable of guiding the idea of 
preservation and renewal of tradition. Among the many new institutions emerging for such pur-
pose, two may exemplify the challenge put by continuity and change when dealing with "the re-
invention oftradition". One is "Kisse Rachamim", one ofthe most elitists - but controversial- ye-
shivas in Bnei-Brak. Its curriculum places a great de al of emphasis on the renewal of Sephardic 
pronunciation. Students and teachers rewrite books related to religious themes, and clarify in all 
the pages the correct spelling and notation. 
This strategy coexists with other characteristics of modern educational systems: selectivity, 
and the encouragement of initiative and innovation. The adrnission rate is 25 percent of appli-
cants, based on an entrance examination adrninistered by an external committee that applies, 
in the words of one of the heads of the Yeshiva, "impersonal criteria of selection". Pedagogi-
cal methods derive, according to one of the heads of the institution, from those that had been 
practíced in Tunisia, the country of origin of the founders of the institution. In contrast to the 
scholastic style of Ashkenazi yeshivas (the pílpul), based on memorization, teaching at this Ye-
shiva focuses on "understanding rather than 'memorizing, thus encouraging individuality in the 
approach to the original texts (Gemara, Rashi and others)" with the purpose of allowing students 
to develop a crÍtical and sharp mind, in order to attain "the only possible truth". 
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Another interesting organization that we visited during the research period is the "Research 
Institute of Education and Behavior," whose goals, in the words of a prominent Shas rabbi, 
are "to find in the traditional sources the parallel to universal sources", a necessary bridge, for 
traditional premises can be enriched by new questions deriving from the modero world. In his 
view, the potential ofknowledge developed from rational assumptions is limited, and it must be 
expanded on the basis of tradition. He strives to codify the original religious sources in a new 
hierarchical order, derived from the main questions put forth by modero sociology, psychology, 
pedagogy and other modero types of knowledge. His expectation is that this codification will 
allow not only a new reading of the ancient texts but, abo ve all, the generation of new answers 
to questions resulting from what he calls "rational modemity".ln the instítute, members use new 
technologies (data bases, connectíons with the universíty libraries, and others) to codify informa-
tion related to topics ofcontemporary interest, such as the quality ofthe environment, questions 
of ídentity, psychologícal conceros, and so on. Through the confrontation of both systems of 
knowledge, they expect to create a new intellectual language capable of embracing the secular 
questioning with the religious answers, and thus realize the old visíon according to whích "from 
Zíon will come forth Torah". Our interviewees complained about the lack of symmetry between 
their world ofknowledge and the academic one. They claim to be ready to leam from the new 
philosophies questions conceroing man's life in this world, but they perceive the academic world 
as closed to religious wisdom. They hope to create a common ground, where they would meet 
modero academics and ponder the basis of all knowledge. Following the precepts of the Rabbi 
Ovadia Yosef, they seek a creative compromise with moderoity, in which the adaptation ofmod-
em forms of teaching and interpretation would allow the voice of traditionalism to be heard in 
the modem world. 
THE TENSION BETWEEN ETHNICITY AND RELIGlON 
With the rise of Shas Israel have extended arrangements, which previously operated in the 
Jewish religious sphere to the ethnic sphere, at least de Jacto. The party has persuaded the state 
to create what is in effect a special, strictly Orthodox educational network for children ofNorth 
African and Middle Eastero parentage. Hitherto the only ethnically based special provision - of 
education, and implicitly of municipal services in areas with predominantly Arab population -
was of a discriminatory kind, a truncated citizenship for the remaining Arab population (Louer 
2007t. The polítical cJass did not actively seek to suppress diversity, but neither did they ever 
seriously consider the notion of a politics of identity as a device to achieve inclusion. In fact 
affirmative action (not the same thing of course) has existed, as we explained, but for the Arab 
population to help them gain access to universities. Among the Jewish population poverty 
and exclusion the issues that often underlie claims for ethnic recognition - were treated as 
matters for social policy. Even when, as in the 1970s, differences of origin were recognized as 
causes of differential educational achievement, and catch-up programms were devised for the 
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traditions of worship and religious observance, in which ethnic identity acted as an appendage. 
disadvantaged, this was in no way ¡ntended to be an identity-specific education or a basis for any 
kind of identity politics. 
Note, however, that ethnic identity is no more a matter of straightforward labeling here than 
anywhere else. Thus in this case, despite the universal assumption in daily parlance that schools, 
clubs, associations and the like gathered under the aegis of Shas politicalleaders (Ha-Ma 'ayan 
and El Ha-Ma 'ayan) are for the benefit of Sephardim, there is no official mention of ethnic dif-
ference in the provisions for these activities and associations: the ethnic belonging is entirely 
ímplicít and non-codified, though sustained by elaborate, tacit and informal codeso Shas edu-
cational ínstitutions are open to all, but in practice pupils are overwhelmíngly Sephardi, though 
Shas teachers and politicians have spoken to us with príde of their openness, and we\come non-
Sephardi pupils as a recognition of the quality of the service they offer. Their interest is in not 
having a numerus clausus, especially since they are a long way from attracting a majority of 
Sephardi children. Likewise, although the Shas inclination of these institutíons is universally 
recognized, it cannot be officially admitted because that would confirm the poli tic al adherence 
of educational and cívic bornes, which is not admissible. 
The Sephardi character of the schools is manifested in symbolic markers -dress, physical 
appearance, music, the Iiturgical use of Sephardi Hebrew pronunciation, ubiquitous pictures 
of Ovadia Yosef7- but hardly in the substance of the currículum, whích is heavily religious 
and ultra-Orthodox, but has Hule distinctively Sephardi in its content. For example, we found 
nothing on the 2000 years or more of history of Jews in Arabic-speaking societies. However, by 
establishing a set of institutional arrangements in response to the needs or traditions of an ethnic 
group -defined in these cases religiously and to some extent even ideologically- the state set a 
precedent for something Hke the group-differentiated rights. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The discussion aboye makes it clear how the educational sphere may be a vehicle creating 
the appropriate conditions for the construction of new cultural spaces. Shas, is in fact a move-
ment, which takes advantage ofthe bureaucratic state and the dynamics ofdemocratic politics in 
order to spread and consolidate a new identity based on a newly formulated ethnic and religious 
content. This is facilitated by the state's institutionalized response that, rather than establishing 
mediating mechanisms among the different groups and enhancing the common dimensions of 
identity, strengthens the demarcation of their cultural distinctiveness. But the pattero of recogni-
tíon enhanced by Israel's version of the religiously motivated social c1osure, also characterizes 
many contemporary religious movements in dífferent areas. Hence, the creation of new ethníc 
and religious spaces has multiple causes and it turos out to have very interesting polítical poten-
tíal, and by no means only in the Israelí context. 
As a Rabbínic sage, of course not as a politicalleader. .. 
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